ABSNFT: Securitization and Repurchase Scheme for Non-Fungible Tokens Based on Game Theoretical Analysis
Hongyin Chen, Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Wenhan Huang, Linxuan Rong
The Non-Fungible Token (NFT) is viewed as one of the important applications
of blockchain technology. Although NFT has a large market scale and multiple
practical standards, several limitations of the existing mechanism in NFT
markets exist. This work proposes a novel securitization and repurchase scheme
for NFT to overcome these limitations. We first provide an Asset-Backed
Securities (ABS) solution to settle the limitations of non-fungibility of NFT.
Our securitization design aims to enhance the liquidity of NFTs and enable
Oracles and Automatic Market Makers (AMMs) for NFTs. Then we propose a novel
repurchase protocol for a participant owing a portion of NFT to repurchase
other shares to obtain the complete ownership. As participants may
strategically bid during the acquisition process, our repurchase process is
formulated as a Stackelberg game to explore the equilibrium prices. We also
provide solutions to handle difficulties at market such as budget constraints
and lazy bidders.